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One of the most important issues in the regulatory reform debate is that of systemically 
important ﬁ  nancial institutions. This paper proposes a framework for identifying and 
supervising such institutions; the framework is designed to remove the advantages they 
derive from becoming systemically important and to give them more time-consistent 
incentives. It deﬁ  nes criteria for classifying ﬁ  rms as systemically important: size (the 
classic doctrine of too big to let fail) and the four C’s of systemic importance (contagion, 
concentration, correlation, and conditions); it also discusses the concept of progressive 
systemic mitigation. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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Introduction
Central banks increasingly deﬁ  ne ﬁ  nancial stability as a key mission, second only to monetary pol-
icy. Achieving ﬁ  nancial stability involves promoting time-consistent incentives for ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms 
and other market participants. Getting the incentives right requires supervisors to deal with sys-
temic risk and, in particular, systemically important ﬁ  nancial institutions. Establishing a ﬁ  nancial 
stability supervisor alone will not achieve stability; it is also crucial to deal proactively with sys-
temically important ﬁ  nancial institutions. To do so, it is necessary to have a workable deﬁ  nition of 
“systemically important.”
On one level, the deﬁ  nition is fairly simple. A ﬁ  rm is considered systemically important if its 
failure would have economically signiﬁ  cant spillover eﬀ  ects which, if left unchecked, could desta-
bilize the ﬁ  nancial system and have a negative impact on the real economy. Th  is  deﬁ  nition is un-
satisfactory because it provides little guidance in practice. What we need is a workable deﬁ  nition 
of “systemically important.” However, because a variety of factors could make a ﬁ  rm systemically 
important, a one-size-ﬁ  ts-all deﬁ  nition would not be very useful.
What can be gained from putting parameters around the term? Delineating the factors that 
might make a ﬁ  nancial institution systemically important is the ﬁ  rst step towards managing the 
risk arising from it. Understanding why a ﬁ  rm might be systemically important is necessary to 
establish measures that reduce the number of such ﬁ  rms and to develop procedures for resolving 
the insolvency of systemically important ﬁ  rms at the lowest total cost (including the long-run 
cost) to the economy.
Th   is paper aims to establish a set of criteria for designating ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms as systemically im-
portant. First, the sources of systemic risk are identiﬁ  ed by considering how a ﬁ  nancial institution 
becomes systemically important. Regarding systemic importance as a continuum rather than a 
binary distinction, we then investigate the usefulness of establishing categories of systemic im-
portance and the trade-oﬀ   between a manageable deﬁ  nition and the number of categories used to 
classify ﬁ  nancial institutions. Next we discuss the establishment of a list of systemically important 
ﬁ  nancial institutions, weigh the merits of making such a list public, and oﬀ  er criteria for catego-
rizing institutions. We close with conclusions and policy recommendations.
Deﬁ  ning Systemically Important Financial Institutions
Th   e purpose of creating a practical deﬁ  nition of systemic importance is to enable supervisors to dis-
cipline systemically important ﬁ  nancial institutions. Understanding the nature and causes of sys-
temic importance is the foundation for creating regulations, supervisory policies, and infrastruc-
ture that will rein in the associated systemic risk; in some cases, doing so suﬃ   ciently mitigates an 
institution’s potential systemic impact so that it would no longer be considered systemically impor-
tant. Because any two ﬁ  rms could be deemed systemically important for unrelated reasons, a one-
size-ﬁ  ts-all designation such as “too big to fail” is inadequate.1 Consequently, the approach taken 
here is to propose a means of classifying systemically important ﬁ  nancial institutions (SIFIs).
1. The  ﬁ  rst incarnation of 
the philosophy of “too big 
to let fail,” dates back to 
the FDIC bailout of the 
Continental Illinois Bank 
and Trust Company of 
Chicago in 1984. For a 
discussion of the failure 
and rescue of Continental 
Illinois, see Irwin Sprague, 
1986, Bailout: An Insider’s 
Account of Bank Failures 
and Rescues, N.Y.: Basic 
Books.POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 27, AUGUST 2009
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Size
Th   e simplest—and potentially most ﬂ  awed—way to classify SIFIs is a size threshold, whether it be 
asset-based, activity-based, or both. Ideally, a size-based classiﬁ  cation should have a ﬂ  ow of funds/
credit intermediation aspect. For instance, a bank with 5 percent of assets nationwide that holds a 
portfolio made up largely of government and agency securities is likely to have less serious systemic 
implications than a comparable bank with a portfolio of commercial and industrial loans. After all, 
the bank holding mostly low-risk, marketable securities will be less likely to fail—and will suﬀ  er 
fewer losses if it does fail—than the bank holding more opaque, riskier commercial and industrial 
loans. Oﬀ  -balance-sheet activities might also need to be accounted for. Credit substitutes, such as 
letters of credit and lines of credit, are rightfully included in ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms’ credit-intermediation 
activities. Moreover, it is important to deﬁ  ne SIFIs in a way that minimizes unintended conse-
quences, such as reducing market discipline on ﬁ  rms added to the SIFI list. 
Size alone is not an adequate criterion. Although the size threshold could certainly be set low 
enough to capture most of the ﬁ  rms that are systemically important for other reasons, the major-
ity would not be systemically important. Including these ﬁ  rms would put too heavy a burden on 
them: One objective of deﬁ  ning systemically important institutions is to allow diﬀ  erential regula-
tory taxes across types. Eﬃ   ciency and equity concerns therefore require more ﬂ  exible deﬁ  nitions. 
Th  e  deﬁ  nitions presented here will be based on four factors other than size which, individually 
or collectively, can make a ﬁ  nancial institution systemically important. Th   ese are the four C’s of 
systemic importance: contagion, correlation, concentration, and conditions (context). 
As a starting point for a size-based deﬁ  nition, a ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rm would be considered systemically 
important if it accounts for at least 10 percent of the activities or assets of a principal ﬁ  nancial 
sector or ﬁ  nancial market or 5 percent of total ﬁ  nancial market activities or assets.2 Using current 
ﬁ  nancial-sector designations as a guide, a SIFI would satisfy any of the following criteria.3
Th   e consolidated entity holds 10 percent or more of nationwide banking assets • 
Or has 5 percent of nationwide banking assets and 15 percent or more of loans.   –
After converting oﬀ  -balance-sheet activities into balance-sheet equivalents, the consolidat- • 
ed entity holds 10 percent or more of nationwide banking assets. 
Oﬀ  -balance-sheet items would include, for instance, items from schedule RC-L from    –
the FFIEC Reports of Income and Condition and HC-L from the Federal Reserve Y9 
reports; structured investment vehicles and other loan special purpose entities used to 
remove assets from the ﬁ  rm’s balance sheet for regulatory capital purposes; and assets 
sold or securitized.
It might be prudent to apply the adjusted-asset test only to ﬁ  nancial institutions that    –
hold more than 5 percent of U.S. banking assets.
Th   e consolidated entity accounts for 10 percent of the total number or total value of life  • 
insurance products (whole and universal life policies and annuities) nationwide. 
Th   e consolidated entity accounts for 15 percent of the total number or total value of all  • 
2.  These standards could 
be established on a book 
or fair-market basis. 
Ideally, SIFI thresholds 
would be determined 
using fair-value account-
ing when possible.
3.  These are examples 
of possible thresholds. 
However, any proposed 
system of thresholds 
must be vetted and, if 
possible, established 
(and periodically 
updated) on the basis of 
empirical studies.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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insurance products (whole and universal life policies, property and casualty policies, annui-
ties, etc.) nationwide.
A nonbank ﬁ  nancial institution (other than a traditional insurance company) such as an  • 
investment bank might be considered systemically important if 
Its total asset holdings would rank it as one of the 10 largest banks in the country   –
Its total assets would rank it in the top 20 largest banks and its adjusted total assets (ac-   0
counting for oﬀ  -balance sheet activities) would rank it in the top 10 largest banks 
It accounted for more than 20 percent of securities underwritten (averaged over the    –
previous ﬁ  ve years).
Contagion
Th   e two classic cases of contagion as a source of systemic importance are Herstatt Bank and Con-
tinental Illinois, both in 1984. Although Herstatt was a relatively small institution, its closing had 
the potential to disrupt the international payments system and imposed nontrivial losses on its 
counterparties. As discussed in Todd and Th   omson (1991), the stated rationale for the FDIC bail-
out of all Continental Illinois’s creditors was the threat that losses would be transmitted to some 
2,300 community banks that had correspondent-banking relationships with Continental.4 Most 
recently, the justiﬁ  cation for the Federal Reserve of New York’s assisted acquisition of Bear Stearns 
by JPMorgan Chase appears to have been concerns about contagion; in this case, the source of con-
tagion was the potential of loss transmission through the credit-default-swaps market. In principle, 
the ability to put parameters around contagion as source of systemic importance should enable ef-
fective treatments to mitigate contagion. 
A ﬁ  nancial institution would be considered systemically important if its failure could result in
Substantial capital impairment of institutions accounting for a combined 30 percent of the  • 
assets of the ﬁ  nancial system
Th   e locking up or material impairment of essential payments systems (domestic or inter- • 
national)
Th   e collapse or freezing up of one or more important ﬁ  nancial markets. • 
A substantial impairment of a payments system or market would be one that is large or long 
enough to aﬀ  ect real economic activity.5
Correlation
Correlation, as a source of systemic importance, is also known as the “too many to fail” problem. 
Penati and Protopapadakis show how correlated risk exposure contributed to the overexposure of 
large U.S. banks to borrowers in developing countries.6 Th   ere are two important aspects of corre-
lation risk. First are the institutions’ incentives to take on risks that are highly correlated with other 
institutions because policymakers are less likely to close an institution if many other institutions 
would become decapitalized at the same time. Th  is is consistent with the casual observation of 
herding behavior in the ﬁ  nancial system which, in the most recent episode, took the form of ﬁ  nan-
4.  Walker F. Todd and 
James B. Thomson, 
1991, “An Insider’s 
View of the Political 
Economy of the Too Big 
to Let Fail Doctrine.” In 
Public Budgeting and 
Financial Management: 
An International Journal, 
3:547–617. 
5.  It is important to deﬁ  ne 
the parameters of a 
material or substantial 
disruption of the pay-
ments system carefully; 
studies are needed to 
establish these.
6. See  Alessandro  Penati 
and Aris Protopapadakis, 
1988, “The Effect 
of Implicit Deposit 
Insurance on Banks’ 
Portfolio Choices 
with an Application 
to International 
Overexposure,” Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 21: 
107–26. For a discus-
sion of the too many to 
fail problem, see Janet 
Mitchell, 1988, “Strategic 
Creditor Passivity, 
Regulation, and Bank 
Bailouts,” CEPR discus-
sion paper no. 1780.POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 27, AUGUST 2009
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cial institutions overexposing themselves to subprime mortgages, mortgage-backed securities, and 
related mortgage-derivative securities. Second is the potential for largely uncorrelated risk expo-
sures to become highly correlated in periods of ﬁ  nancial stress. Andrew Lo calls this phenomenon 
“phase-locking behavior.”7 Th   is means that a group of institutions that would not typically pose 
a systemic threat might, in certain economic or ﬁ  nancial-market conditions, become systemically 
important. Th   is second form of correlation-driven systemic importance is actually an example of 
condition- or context-driven systemic importance. 
Th   e too-many-to-fail problem is a bit more diﬃ   cult because it requires that a group or subset 
of institutions be classiﬁ  ed as jointly systemic. As in the case of contagion, putting parameters 
around correlated risk exposure (including determining what level of correlation across portfolios 
poses a systemic threat), is the ﬁ  rst step towards developing and implementing regulatory treat-
ments. Classifying institutions as systemically important because of correlated risks will mean 
developing and estimating risk models, using stress testing and scenario analysis, and establishing 
a set of fundamental risk exposures that ﬁ  nancial institutions’ portfolios can be mapped into. For-
tunately, some large ﬁ  nancial institutions are doing this type of risk modeling and scenario analy-
sis for looking at their own risk proﬁ  le: their work provides a good foundation for other to work 
from. Moreover, academic economists have begun thinking about modeling macro-ﬁ  nancial risks 
in the economy, a step towards modeling and quantifying correlated-risk exposure.8
What levels of correlated risks would give rise to systemic concerns? Th   resholds that would 
make groups of institutions systemically important include
Th  e probability that an economic or ﬁ  nancial shock would decapitalize institutions ac- • 
counting, in aggregate, for 35 percent of ﬁ  nancial system assets or 20 percent of banking 
assets 
Potential for economic/ﬁ  nancial shock to decapitalize institutions accounting, in aggregate,  • 
for 15 percent of ﬁ  nancial system assets or 10 percent of banking assets, and for nationwide 
shares amounting to
50 percent of wholesale or retail payments, or   –
35 percent of a major credit activity,   – 9 or
50 percent of securities processing or 30 percent of securities underwriting (ﬁ  ve-year    –
average), or
20 percent of the total number or total value of life insurance products (universal and    –
whole life policies and annuities), or 
30 percent of the total number or total value of insurance products (whole and univer-   –
sal life policies, property and casualty policies, annuities, etc.).
Concentration
Dominant ﬁ  rms’ presence in key ﬁ  nancial markets or activities can give rise to systemic importance 
if the failure of one of these ﬁ  rms could materially disrupt or lock up the market. Concentration 
has two important aspects: the size of the ﬁ  rm’s activities relative to the contestability of the mar-
7.  See Andrew W. Lo, 2008, 
Hedge Funds: An Analytic 
Perspective. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University 
Press.
8.  See for example, Dale F. 
Gray, Robert C. Merton, 
and Zvi Bodie, 2006, 
“A New Framework for 
Analyzing and Managing 
Macroﬁ  nancial Risks 
of an Economy,” NBER 
Working Paper no. 12637, 
October. Available at 
<http://www.nber.org/
papers/w12637>.
9.  Fairly broad deﬁ  nitions 
of credit activities should 
be used: For instance, 
the categories might 
include commercial credit, 
housing ﬁ  nance, small-
business credit, agricul-
tural credit, and consumer 
credit. Moreover, it is 
necessary to establish a 
threshold for categorizing 
a credit activity as major.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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ket. Th   at is, concentration is less likely to make a ﬁ  nancial institution systemically important if, 
other things being equal, the activities of a distressed institution can easily be assumed by a new 
entrant into the market or by the expansion of an incumbent ﬁ  rm’s activities. Hence, it is logical 
to adjust concentration thresholds to account for contestability. 
A ﬁ  nancial institution is systemically important if its failure could materially disrupt a ﬁ  nan-
cial market or payments system, causing economically signiﬁ  cant spillover eﬀ  ects that impede the 
functioning of broader ﬁ  nancial markets and/or the real economy. Th   resholds for concentration 
that would render a ﬁ  nancial institution systemically important include any ﬁ  rm (on a consoli-
dated basis) that
Clears and settles more than 25 percent of trades in a key ﬁ  nancial market. • 
Processes more than 25 percent of the daily volume of an essential payments system. • 
Is responsible for more than 30 percent of an important credit activity.  • 
Conditions/Context
In certain states of nature or some macro-ﬁ  nancial conditions, closure policy may not be inde-
pendent of these conditions. In other words, regulators are reluctant to allow the oﬃ   cial failure 
(closure) of a distressed ﬁ  nancial institution under particular economic or ﬁ  nancial market condi-
tions if its solvency could have been resolved under more normal conditions. Hence, conditions/
context are sources of systemic importance. For instance, Haubrich notes that the New York Fed’s 
reluctance to allow the failure of Long-Term Capital Management resulted largely from the fra-
gility of ﬁ  nancial markets at that time—due to the Southeast Asian currency crises and the Rus-
sian default.10 Th   is might explain, in part, why LTCM was treated as systemically important and 
Amaranth (which was more than twice as big) was not. Another example would be intervention 
to prevent the bankruptcy of Bear Stearns by merging it (with assistance) into JPMorgan Chase 
in early 2008, whereas Drexel Burnham Lambert was allowed to enter bankruptcy in early 1990. 
Firms that might be made systemically important by conditions/context are probably the most dif-
ﬁ  cult to identify in advance. Certainly, stress testing and scenario analysis will be needed to iden-
tify them. As discussed above, during periods of ﬁ  nancial market distress, phase-locking behavior 
can cause what would otherwise be slightly correlated risk exposures to become highly correlated. 
As a result, a group of institutions that would not pose a systemic threat under normal economic 
or ﬁ  nancial-market conditions become systemically important. 
Two sets of criteria must be established to classify ﬁ  rms that are systemically important because 
of context. First is the probability that economic or ﬁ  nancial conditions will materialize that pro-
duce the state of nature where a ﬁ  rm or group of ﬁ  rms becomes systemically important. Second 
are the thresholds for systemic importance, which presumably would be based on those used to 
classify SIFIs according to contagion, concentration, and correlation during normal market con-
ditions; which thresholds are applied would depend on which type of systemic importance the 
conditions produce. 
10. See Joseph G. Haubrich, 
2007, “Some Lessons on 
the Rescue of Long-Term 
Capital Management,” 
Federal Reserve Bank 
of Cleveland, Policy 
Discussion Paper. No. 19, 
April.POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 27, AUGUST 2009
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Establishing SIFI Categories
One way to classify systemically important ﬁ  nancial institutions was suggested in the Geneva re-
port: 11 Institutions may be systemic on their own, as part of group, or in a particular context (or 
state of the economy). Under this classiﬁ  cation scheme, there would likely be four or ﬁ  ve categories 
of institutions: Category four would consist of large—but not overly complex—regional ﬁ  nancial 
institutions; category ﬁ  ve would consist of community ﬁ  nancial institutions. Institutions could 
migrate between categories as their activities and risks evolve. 
Constructing categories permits application of the modern tax principles of horizontal and 
vertical equity in regulating FISIs. Within each category, every ﬁ  nancial institution would be 
subject to equivalent regulatory treatment and intensity of supervision. Of course, because two 
institutions could fall under the same category for diﬀ  erent reasons, the exact forms of their regu-
latory taxes would logically diﬀ  er. In this case, equitable treatment consists of the same degree 
of regulatory interference (level of regulatory taxes), although the forms of regulation may not 
be exactly the same. As you move up the categories, ﬁ  rms would be subject to increased levels 
of regulatory interference and supervisory attention—that is, progressive systemic mitigation—
analogous to the prompt corrective action provisions of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion Improvement Act of 1991.
Increased regulatory taxes and supervisory scrutiny for higher categories can be justiﬁ  ed in 
terms of economic eﬃ   ciency and equity. For instance, economic eﬃ   ciency dictates that regulato-
ry taxes increase to the point where the cost of the last increment of these taxes equals the beneﬁ  t 
of imposing them. It is likely that the cost of complying with additional regulations is inversely 
related to an institution’s size and complexity, while the beneﬁ  ts from additional regulation are 
directly related. Hence, as institutions become larger and more complex, increased regulation 
and more intensive supervision may be consistent with economic eﬃ   ciency. Furthermore, to the 
extent that the wedge between the private and social costs of failure is related to an institution’s 
size and complexity, economic eﬃ   ciency demands graduated sets of regulatory taxes, which are 
designed to internalize the externalities. 
Th  ere are equally compelling arguments for progressively intensive or intrusive regulatory 
treatments on the grounds of equity as you move up the systemic category ladder. One such is the 
“level playing ﬁ  eld” argument: To the extent that systemic importance confers competitive advan-
tages on an institution, equity concerns would dictate a system of graduated regulatory taxes to 
remove (or at least minimize) the advantages of being (or becoming) systemically important. 
Of the ﬁ  ve categories, only three would contain ﬁ  nancial institutions that are considered sys-
temically important. Th   e rationale for a ﬁ  ve-category system is that it allows for more consistent 
application of regulatory taxes and supervisory oversight across categories, following the notion 
that diﬀ  erential supervision and regulation can level the playing ﬁ  eld by mitigating the advan-
tages ﬁ  nancial institutions derive from systemic importance.12 Th  e categories would likely be 
deﬁ  ned as follows:
11. Markus Brunnermeier, 
Andrew Crocket, Charles 
Goodhart, Avinash D. 
Persaud, and Hyun Shin, 
“Fundamental Principles of 
Financial Regulation,” 2009. 
Geneva Reports on the 
World Economy, 11.
12. Another rationale for 
systemic categories is 
that the degree to which 
markets can or would 
be allowed to discipline 
systemic institutions 
differs across categories, 
with higher categories 
containing ﬁ  nancial 
institutions where market 
discipline is less likely to 
be effective (or those that 
are allowed to operate 
unfettered).FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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Category 1 
Financial institutions that would be considered SIFIs on the basis of size alone (the classic 
too big to let fail category) or to concentration (the ﬁ  rm is a dominant player in an eco-
nomically signiﬁ  cant ﬁ  nancial market or activity)
Category 2
Financial institutions that are systemically important because of interconnectedness (in-
terbank or inter-ﬁ  rm exposure, also known as contagion) 
Category 3
Financial institutions that are systemically important as a group because of correlated risk 
exposures (the too many to fail problem). Also included in category 3 would be ﬁ  nancial 
institutions that are systemically important because of conditions or context
Category 4
Large ﬁ  nancial institutions that are not systemically important but whose failure could 
have economically signiﬁ  cant implications for regional economies. Th   is category would 
include large regional banking companies and large insurance companies.
Category 5
Financial institutions not included in the other categories, consisting primarily of com-
munity ﬁ  nancial institutions.
Under the philosophy of progressive systemic mitigation, institutions in category 5 would be 
subject to a basic level of safety-and-soundness regulation and supervisory oversight. No special 
reporting requirements, targeted risk exams, or other treatments would be necessary.13 Category 
4 institutions would not face any special capital surcharges or activity restrictions that might ap-
ply in categories 1–3, but they would be subject to additional reporting requirements and expect-
ed to implement risk management systems and more sophisticated risk controls than category 
5 institutions. Moreover, category 4 institutions would be subject to more vigorous supervision 
than those in category 5.14 
 At a minimum, category 3 institutions should be subject to periodic stress tests and be re-
quired to have contingency plans in place. Regulatory agencies need to conduct routine scenario 
analysis and simulations to ascertain the ﬁ  nancial system’s vulnerability to a correlated-risk event 
and establish the appropriate regulatory treatment. Such treatment might include actions like 
portfolio limits, add-on capital requirements, and loss reserves tied to the activities driving the 
correlated risks. Scenario analysis and risk simulations would be used as part of contingency plans 
for handling correlated risk events. Stress tests, scenario analysis, risk simulations, and contin-
gency plans would also be part of the operational regulatory system for dealing with institutions 
that are rendered systemically important by conditions or context.
Progressive systemic mitigation implies that the treatments adopted for category 3 institutions 
should also be applied to those in categories 1 and 2. For category 2 institutions, it is necessary to 
13. These institutions 
would remain subject to 
consumer regulation.
14. Recently, Federal 
Reserve Bank of 
Cleveland President 
Sandra Pianalto outlined 
a new regulatory scheme, 
“tiered parity,” in which 
ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms would 
be separated into three 
classes or tiers based 
upon their complexity. As 
in the present proposal, 
the regulatory treatment 
of a ﬁ  rm would be deter-
mined according to the 
tier it is assigned to (with 
equal regulatory treatment 
of ﬁ  rms within a tier). To 
go from the ﬁ  ve-category 
progressive systemic 
mitigation scheme to the 
three tiers of the tiered-
parity scheme, you simply 
combine categories 4 and 
5 into tier 3 and catego-
ries 2 and 3 into tier 2. 
Category 1 of progressive 
systemic mitigation is es-
sentially the same as tier 
1 of the Cleveland Fed’s 
tiered-parity proposal. 
For a description of tiered 
parity, see Sandra 
Pianalto, “Steps toward a 
New Financial Regulatory 
Architecture,” Ohio 
Banker’s Day address, 
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establish regulatory reporting requirements that allow for inter-bank/inter-ﬁ  rm exposures, direct 
and indirect, to be tracked and measured. In addition, limits on direct and indirect exposure 
to counterparties should be instituted, along with speciﬁ  c reserves and add-on capital charges 
designed to limit contagion across ﬁ  rms. For category 1 institutions, two more types of regula-
tory treatment need to be added to those faced by category 2 institutions. First, market disci-
pline should be enhanced through mandatory debt-structure requirements, which could include 
a mandatory subordinated debt requirement and/or reverse convertible debentures.15 Moreover, 
a system of double indemnity for shareholders in category 1 institutions could be an eﬀ  ective 
device for providing socially compatible incentives for those institutions.16
Th   is is only a partial set of remedies that might be applied progressively to ﬁ  nancial institu-
tions in each category. Naturally, the exact regulatory treatments and the nature of the increased 
supervisory attention would need additional study. After all, as a system of regulatory taxes, pro-
gressive systemic mitigation is subject to the regulatory dialectic. Consequently, it is important to 
understand the unintended consequences of whatever treatments are adopted.17 Such an under-
standing will help reduce the deadweight losses of the regulatory regime and increase regulators’ 
ability to respond dynamically to an evolving ﬁ  nancial system. 
Transparency versus Constructive Ambiguity: 
Should the List of SIFIs Be Public?
How much information is made public (details about SIFIs, criteria for inclusion in the catego-
ries, and the associated regulatory treatment) depends on several factors: the extent to which the 
supervisory regime utilizes market discipline; whether inclusion on the list has unintended certiﬁ  -
cation eﬀ  ects (or, alternatively, whether ambiguity reduces the credibility of implicit government 
guarantees); and the degree to which markets can reliably indentify the ﬁ  nancial institutions that 
populate the categories.18 Th   e more information is released—that is, the closer the regime is to full 
disclosure—the more side issues must be addressed. For instance, how will an institution’s inclu-
sion in—or removal from—the list of SIFIs or the promotion (demotion) to a higher (lower) cat-
egory be communicated? Will there be watch lists of SIFIs that are under consideration for change 
in status? Would the names of ﬁ  rms that are systemically important because of context/conditions 
be made public and, if so, what additional information (such as risk models, scenario analysis, and 
simulations) should be provided?
Th   e choice of disclosure regime would seem to be between transparency (publication of the 
list of ﬁ  rms in each category) and some version of constructive ambiguity, where selected infor-
mation is released. Th   e term “constructive ambiguity” has been attributed to former Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger;19 in a diplomatic context, it refers to the use of ambiguous statements as 
part of a negotiating strategy. However, in the context of central banking and ﬁ  nancial markets, 
the term refers to a policy of using ambiguous statements to signal intent while retaining policy 
ﬂ  exibility. In the context of the federal ﬁ  nancial safety net, many have argued for a policy of 
17. For a discussion of the 
regulatory dialectic, see 
Edward J. Kane, 1977, 
“Good Intentions and 
Unintended Evil: The 
Case against Selective 
Credit Allocation,” 
Journal of Money, Credit, 
and Banking, 9:1, 55–69.
16. See Edward J. Kane, 
1987, “No Room for 
Weak Links in the Chain 
of Deposit Insurance 
Reform,” Journal of 
Financial Services 
Research, 1:77–111.
15. For a discussion of man-
datory subordinated debt 
requirements, see Rong 
Fan, Joseph G. Haubrich, 
Peter Ritchken, and 
James B. Thomson, 2003, 
“Getting the Most Out of a 
Mandatory Subordinated 
Debt Requirement,” 
Journal of Financial 
Services Research, 
24:2/3, 149–79; Reverse 
convertible debentures 
are discussed in Mark J. 
Flannery, “No Pain, No 
Gain? Effecting Market 










18. For an analysis of how 
markets discover regula-
tory information, see Allen 
Berger, Sally M. Davies, 
and Mark J. Flannery, 
2000, “Comparing 
Market and Supervisory 
Assessments of Bank 
Performance: Who Knows 
What When?” Journal 
of Money, Credit, and 
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constructive ambiguity to limit expansion of the federal ﬁ  nancial safety net.20 Th   e notion here 
is that if market participants are uncertain whether their claim on a ﬁ  nancial institution will be 
guaranteed, they will exert more risk discipline on the ﬁ  rm. In this context, constructive ambigu-
ity is a regulatory tactic for limiting the extent to which de facto government guarantees are ex-
tended to the liabilities of the ﬁ  rms that regulators consider systemically important. Uncertainty 
about whether a ﬁ  rm is considered systemically important and which category it belongs to in 
the progressive systemic mitigation regime may, at the margin, exert stronger market discipline 
on institutions than if the list of SIFIs were made public.
For a number of reasons, a policy of supervisory transparency is superior to constructive ambi-
guity for our purposes. First, constructive ambiguity, broadly viewed, is a competitor of the pro-
gressive systemic mitigation regime proposed in this paper. Constructive ambiguity is a supervi-
sory policy aimed at reducing the agency problems associated with ﬁ  rms’ systemic importance by 
creating uncertainty about which ﬁ  rms and creditors might be rescued if a ﬁ  rm fails. Progressive 
systemic mitigation is an explicit set of regulations and supervisory policies designed to reduce (if 
not eliminate) the advantages of being systemically important. Under its rules, the social costs of 
systemic importance would be internalized by the institution and its stakeholders. Second, to the 
extent that SIFIs would be subject to speciﬁ  c sets of regulatory treatments, it is unlikely that there 
would be much value in continuing the policy of constructive ambiguity in the proposed progres-
sive systemic mitigation system. After all, markets will probably be able to surmise which ﬁ  rms 
are on the SIFI list by observing diﬀ  erences in capital structure, balance sheet entries (including 
footnotes), and intensity of regulatory scrutiny. Finally, the beneﬁ  t of constructive ambiguity in 
avoiding an SIFI certiﬁ  cation eﬀ  ect that might result from publishing a list of SIFI ﬁ  rms would 
only aﬀ  ect a small number of ﬁ  rms at the margin. Th  e  eﬃ   ciency gains of avoiding the certiﬁ  cation 
eﬀ  ect on these marginally systemic ﬁ  rms is likely to be swamped by eﬃ   ciency losses associated 
with withholding information from the market. Hence, the list of SIFIs, including categories 
and criteria for inclusion, should be made public, along with a watch list of ﬁ  nancial institutions 
whose SIFI status might change.
An eﬀ  ective system of supervisory transparency entails more than simply disclosing informa-
tion; it must also include producing information and disseminating it in a useful form.21 A case 
in point is the argument for requiring credit rating organizations to disclose information, such 
as probabilities of default and loss given default, upon which a rating is based.22 In the supervi-
sory transparency regime, this means that all information used to assign institutions to an SIFI 
category—including supervisory risk models and their results—should be disclosed. 23 Further-
more, stress tests of SIFIs, along with contingency plans for handling the ﬁ  nancial distress of one 
or more large ﬁ  nancial institutions, should be implemented and disclosed. 
20. For a discussion of 
constructive ambigu-
ity as a tool for limiting 
conjectural government 
guarantees of bank 
creditors, see Frederic S. 
Mishkin, 1999, “Financial 
Consolidation: Dangers 
and Opportunities,” 
Journal of Banking and 
Finance 23:2–4, 675–91. 
For a discussion of 
constructive ambiguity in 
the context of lender-of-
last-resort policies, see 
Marvin Goodfriend and 
Jeffrey M. Lacker, 1991, 
“Limited Commitment and 
Central Bank Lending,” 
Federal Reserve Bank 
of Richmond, Economic 
Quarterly, 85:4, 1–27.
21. For an example of useful 
information, see the recom-
mendations of the 2001 
Working Group on Public 
Disclosure, which suggests 
that supervisors release 
information (such as data 
about risk exposure) that 
provides a consistent view 
of a bank’s risk manage-
ment approach. See Board 
of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, 2001, 
SR 01-6: Enhancement to 
Public Disclosure. Division 
of Banking Supervision, 
April.
22. See Charles W. Calomiris, 
2008, “The Subprime 
Turmoil: What’s Old, 
What’s New, and What’s 
Next,” presentation at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City’s symposium, 
“Maintaining Stability in 
a Changing Financial 
System,” August 21–22.
 23. In cases where releasing a 
piece of information could 
result in the disclosure 
of conﬁ  dential business 
information, suppression 
of the information should 
be predicated on a careful 
cost-beneﬁ  t analysis, 
which weighs the ﬁ  nancial 
institution’s private interests 
against the beneﬁ  ts to 
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Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
Th   e legacy of economic and ﬁ  nancial crises is a post-crisis regime characterized by increased gov-
ernment interference in markets. However, simply increasing the amount of formal regulation and 
the degree of supervisory oversight and interference is not necessarily the best path forward. Finan-
cial market reforms must deal in the least-cost way with the fundamental issues that contributed 
to the current crisis. One of the most important issues that regulators, legislators, and other poli-
cymakers must face is that of systemically important ﬁ  nancial institutions.
We propose the study and subsequent adoption of a ﬁ  nancial-market supervisory infrastruc-
ture in which SIFIs are identiﬁ  ed, categorized according to the nature or source of their systemic 
importance, and subjected to speciﬁ  c regulatory treatments that address the risk these ﬁ  rms im-
pose. Th   e ultimate objective of progressive systemic mitigation is to improve economic eﬃ   ciency 
by promoting socially compatible risk incentives for SIFIs and to increase fairness in the ﬁ  nan-
cial system by leveling the playing ﬁ  eld; the means of achieving this are reducing or removing, 
through regulatory taxes, the advantages of being systemically important.
Speciﬁ  c regulatory treatments to deal with the four C’s of systemic importance (contagion, 
correlation, concentration, and context/conditions) must be carefully studied before they are ad-
opted. Th   ese regulatory treatments might include (but are not limited to) capital surcharges, spe-
cial reserves, mandatory subordinated debt and/or reverse capital debentures, inter-ﬁ  rm exposure 
limits, and increased regulatory reporting requirements. Moreover, banking supervisors should 
be required to conduct periodic systemic risk analyses, stress tests, and other simulations as part 
of a contingency planning process that would improve regulators’ ability to deal in a least-cost 
manner (combined short- and long-term costs) with the failure of one or more SIFIs. Finally, the 
information disclosure regime must be addressed when implementing the new supervisory archi-
tecture. We argue for full transparency, which includes publishing the list of SIFIs, presumably on 
a quarterly basis; the criteria for inclusion in an SIFI category; and speciﬁ  c regulatory treatments. 
In addition, ﬁ  nancial institutions whose systemic status may be upgraded or downgraded should 
be included on a published watch list.
One issue we have not dealt with here is the need to establish a credible resolution process for 
SIFIs. Th   is, of course, involves careful consideration of the types of resolution authority needed, 
the funding source for operating any such authority, and the related infrastructure. While a cred-
ible resolution process should involve addressing contingency plans as part of the supervisory 
regime, we leave discussion of the type and form of resolution authority to a companion paper. papers
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